How the Truman doctrine changed American foreign relations (1947-1953)
Emily Hollis
Introduction
In the tense post World War II atmosphere, the question of the American response to the growing communist movement was answered with force. On March 12th, 1947, the president of the United States Harry S. Truman delivered a speech to a joint congress that would change the course of American history. In fulfilling the request from the British government, Truman requested US Congress supply $400 million in financial and military assistance to Greece and Turkey to prevent the spread of communism.[1]
A reluctant interventionalist, Truman had entered the United States into uncharted territory; for the first time, positive action was being used to prevent the spread of the communist threat reinforced by a growing Soviet bloc. Truman’s speech purported to “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” in their fight against communism.[2] This “urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance” was portrayed through a lens of democracy fighting against totalitarian tyranny. The decision to uphold Britain’s request was dependent on Congressional approval and ultimately, public opinion.[3] After all, $400 million represented more than positive foreign relations with Britain, but adopting a burden to prevent the spread of an ideology.
What is the Truman doctrine?
Truman made history when he formally acknowledged the ideological split between the East and West. The US was “distinguished by free institutions,” while the Soviets were characterised as reliant on “terror and oppression.”[4] The British government had requested for the US to send military and economic aid to the Greek and Turkish governments, following Britain’s withdrawal of assistance.[5] Britain’s ambassador had warned the Americans of the high likelihood of “consequent political disturbances,” that would result from ignoring the threat. Britain’s withdrawal of assistance against the incoming communist governments catalysed the US’ decision to instate the doctrine. The decision was not merely to aid the British, however. The communist Tudeh party in Iran, supported by the Soviets, eventually took power in 1944. The US had also witnessed the impact of the crises in Iran between 1945-1946 where the Soviets supported oil concessions and separatist movements. [6] Truman’s interest in protecting freedom meant that eventually, the US could no longer turn a blind eye to the ravaging of a democratic future the post-war world needed.
At the time of the speech, post-war US was in a state of political disarray – the state of the world after Allied victory left a vacuum of power between the Soviet Union and the US. The power of the Greek communist party, the KKE, was poising Greece on the brink of civil war.[7] The KKE had been prosecuting “subversives” before 1947, with prison tolls ranging to 16,000.[8] Yugoslavia’s support of the Turkish government compelled Truman to believe the government yielding to communism was an inevitability, saying “Turkey will not be able to maintain indefinitely a defensive posture against the Soviet Union.”[9] The US feared that without intervening, Eastern Europe would yield to Soviet pressure, jeopardising the architecture of the Western world and its vision for political liberty.
Undoubtedly, the Truman doctrine had an impact on American foreign policy. “Red-pinning,” was the process of labelling someone a communist without much evidence. This became a popular technique; calling opposition a communist demonstrated how truly “American” the whistleblower was, and clutched power over public opinion. The doctrine created a volatile, emotionally charged environment. Who were you, if not a patriotic American? McCarthyism flourished in the environment created by Truman due to the impact of the doctrine’s anti-communist stance. Truman himself was such a staunch anti-communist that it was impossible to differentiate McCarthy’s extremism from Truman’s apparent rationality.[10]
So where did this doctrine come from?
Truman’s anticommunist sentiment had emerged from George Kennan’s telegram. Kennan, the US Ambassador in the Soviet Union, was tasked with describing the state of the Soviet Union and the viability of its government. In response, Kennan wrote “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” a report on his observations of the Soviet government. A refined version would appear anonymously in the magazine Foreign Affairs. The telegram outlined how communism was a “malignant parasite which only feeds on diseased tissue.”[11] Displaying the Soviet Union as tyrannical yet weak as a political system, Kennan painted the Soviet Union as a serious threat to the US and its way of life. Kennan utilised the universalistic language that seemingly encouraged positive action from the US government to prevent Soviet expansionism.
Triumph of McCarthyism?
McCarthyism was the ideology formed by Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, who rose into public consciousness in the 1950s. In 1950, he called Truman an asset of the Kremlin, despite Truman’s efforts to quell domestic communism within his administration by setting up the House of Un-American Committee to list and identify subversive organisations.[12] On February 9, 1950, McCarthy accused President Truman and his secretary Dean Acheson of harbouring communists within their State Department, claiming to possess a list of subversives.[13] His accusatory hyper-vigilance against alleged communists swept the American public into a terror of communism. The containment strategy with universal implications provided a ground upon which McCarthy’s accusations appeared more and more valid. Whoever was the most vigilant towards communists could claim to be the most “American.”
Another consequence of the doctrine included its cultural and political reactions. Walter Lippman, a renowned commentator and journalist, believed that economic aid being sent to Greece and Turkey was a “misuse of American power.”[14] He cited that the shifting “geographical and political points” compelled the US to establish puppet states and satellites to prevent the encroachment of Soviet expansion.[15] Eleanor Roosevelt sent Truman personal letters questioning the aim of the doctrine; she felt that stimulating Europe’s failing economy was more important than preventing the spread of communism.
In the tense post World War II atmosphere, the question of the American response to the growing communist movement was answered with force. On March 12th, 1947, the president of the United States Harry S. Truman delivered a speech to a joint congress that would change the course of American history. In fulfilling the request from the British government, Truman requested US Congress supply $400 million in financial and military assistance to Greece and Turkey to prevent the spread of communism.[1]
A reluctant interventionalist, Truman had entered the United States into uncharted territory; for the first time, positive action was being used to prevent the spread of the communist threat reinforced by a growing Soviet bloc. Truman’s speech purported to “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” in their fight against communism.[2] This “urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance” was portrayed through a lens of democracy fighting against totalitarian tyranny. The decision to uphold Britain’s request was dependent on Congressional approval and ultimately, public opinion.[3] After all, $400 million represented more than positive foreign relations with Britain, but adopting a burden to prevent the spread of an ideology.
What is the Truman doctrine?
Truman made history when he formally acknowledged the ideological split between the East and West. The US was “distinguished by free institutions,” while the Soviets were characterised as reliant on “terror and oppression.”[4] The British government had requested for the US to send military and economic aid to the Greek and Turkish governments, following Britain’s withdrawal of assistance.[5] Britain’s ambassador had warned the Americans of the high likelihood of “consequent political disturbances,” that would result from ignoring the threat. Britain’s withdrawal of assistance against the incoming communist governments catalysed the US’ decision to instate the doctrine. The decision was not merely to aid the British, however. The communist Tudeh party in Iran, supported by the Soviets, eventually took power in 1944. The US had also witnessed the impact of the crises in Iran between 1945-1946 where the Soviets supported oil concessions and separatist movements. [6] Truman’s interest in protecting freedom meant that eventually, the US could no longer turn a blind eye to the ravaging of a democratic future the post-war world needed.
At the time of the speech, post-war US was in a state of political disarray – the state of the world after Allied victory left a vacuum of power between the Soviet Union and the US. The power of the Greek communist party, the KKE, was poising Greece on the brink of civil war.[7] The KKE had been prosecuting “subversives” before 1947, with prison tolls ranging to 16,000.[8] Yugoslavia’s support of the Turkish government compelled Truman to believe the government yielding to communism was an inevitability, saying “Turkey will not be able to maintain indefinitely a defensive posture against the Soviet Union.”[9] The US feared that without intervening, Eastern Europe would yield to Soviet pressure, jeopardising the architecture of the Western world and its vision for political liberty.
Undoubtedly, the Truman doctrine had an impact on American foreign policy. “Red-pinning,” was the process of labelling someone a communist without much evidence. This became a popular technique; calling opposition a communist demonstrated how truly “American” the whistleblower was, and clutched power over public opinion. The doctrine created a volatile, emotionally charged environment. Who were you, if not a patriotic American? McCarthyism flourished in the environment created by Truman due to the impact of the doctrine’s anti-communist stance. Truman himself was such a staunch anti-communist that it was impossible to differentiate McCarthy’s extremism from Truman’s apparent rationality.[10]
So where did this doctrine come from?
Truman’s anticommunist sentiment had emerged from George Kennan’s telegram. Kennan, the US Ambassador in the Soviet Union, was tasked with describing the state of the Soviet Union and the viability of its government. In response, Kennan wrote “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” a report on his observations of the Soviet government. A refined version would appear anonymously in the magazine Foreign Affairs. The telegram outlined how communism was a “malignant parasite which only feeds on diseased tissue.”[11] Displaying the Soviet Union as tyrannical yet weak as a political system, Kennan painted the Soviet Union as a serious threat to the US and its way of life. Kennan utilised the universalistic language that seemingly encouraged positive action from the US government to prevent Soviet expansionism.
Triumph of McCarthyism?
McCarthyism was the ideology formed by Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, who rose into public consciousness in the 1950s. In 1950, he called Truman an asset of the Kremlin, despite Truman’s efforts to quell domestic communism within his administration by setting up the House of Un-American Committee to list and identify subversive organisations.[12] On February 9, 1950, McCarthy accused President Truman and his secretary Dean Acheson of harbouring communists within their State Department, claiming to possess a list of subversives.[13] His accusatory hyper-vigilance against alleged communists swept the American public into a terror of communism. The containment strategy with universal implications provided a ground upon which McCarthy’s accusations appeared more and more valid. Whoever was the most vigilant towards communists could claim to be the most “American.”
Another consequence of the doctrine included its cultural and political reactions. Walter Lippman, a renowned commentator and journalist, believed that economic aid being sent to Greece and Turkey was a “misuse of American power.”[14] He cited that the shifting “geographical and political points” compelled the US to establish puppet states and satellites to prevent the encroachment of Soviet expansion.[15] Eleanor Roosevelt sent Truman personal letters questioning the aim of the doctrine; she felt that stimulating Europe’s failing economy was more important than preventing the spread of communism.
Opinion Polls
The opinion polls demonstrate that at the beginning of his presidency, Harry Truman was well received. His approval rating of 87% in mid-1945 reflected this. Directly after the speech was made to Congress, Truman’s approval ratings had surged from 34% in November 1946 to 60% in March 1947. The polls around 1947 showed Americans were in fact more inclined to send foreign aid than was estimated by officials.[16] However, Truman himself was involved in shaping public opinion to some extent. Between 1947-1948, the Committee for the Marshall Plan compelled and aroused support for the European Recovery program.[17] This could explain the surge in public approval in mid-1947. Clark Clifford, the lead strategist for Truman’s presidency campaign in 1948, was highly aware of the importance of shaping positive public opinion.[18] |
American Presidency Project – Approval Ratings for POTUS – Harry S Truman.
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Famously, the Gallup polls pre-election to the 1948 election incorrectly predicted that Thomas Dewey would win the election by a landslide.[19] At the time, Henry Wallace was running against Truman as an independent. Wallace attacked Truman and liberals as “shameful, immoral and corrupt” for supporting his former president. Impassioned, he called Truman “the best salesman communism ever had.”[20] Despite these attacks, Truman instead won the 1948 election in an upset victory, despite polling numbers at 50% disapproval in April 1948. Public opinion turned towards Truman when they realized his courage and the “uphill battle” he was facing and when he made direct appeals to the nation’s conscience, “Truman won votes because of the spectacular fight that he was making on the largest sounding board of democratic public opinion.”[21] Truman appealed to what the public needed at the time – the issues of affordable housing and the minimum wage. Americans took votes from Dewey because Truman was the common man and gave the nation hope for the flourishing of the American “way of life.”
Another policy emerged in 1949, where the announcement of the Fair Deal in January. This initiated Truman’s campaigning of domestic reform causes. This included raising the minimum wage and providing equal rights to all Americans. This resulted in a surge of public support in early 1949, as seen in the graph. Truman proposed social security, public housing legislation and Fair Employment Practices Act to eliminate discrimination in hiring as early as 1945 but reiterated his position in a speech to Congress on Jan 5, 1949 to establish these domestic reforms as re-elected president. While not all these policies were enacted, Truman’s intentions were clear – freedom and equality for all.
Disaster struck in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War. The escalation of the conflict led Truman to state that “communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer all independent nations.”[22] The polls show public approval for Truman descending as the president entered the Korean War. Americans began to realise that its state had a vital role to play in creating a democratic world by preventing the spread of communism. We can account for the decrease in popularity for Truman as the rise in patriotism; the people wanted more resistance, not less. The enduring legacy of the Truman doctrine leaves behind a unity found in mutual fear.
Another policy emerged in 1949, where the announcement of the Fair Deal in January. This initiated Truman’s campaigning of domestic reform causes. This included raising the minimum wage and providing equal rights to all Americans. This resulted in a surge of public support in early 1949, as seen in the graph. Truman proposed social security, public housing legislation and Fair Employment Practices Act to eliminate discrimination in hiring as early as 1945 but reiterated his position in a speech to Congress on Jan 5, 1949 to establish these domestic reforms as re-elected president. While not all these policies were enacted, Truman’s intentions were clear – freedom and equality for all.
Disaster struck in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War. The escalation of the conflict led Truman to state that “communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer all independent nations.”[22] The polls show public approval for Truman descending as the president entered the Korean War. Americans began to realise that its state had a vital role to play in creating a democratic world by preventing the spread of communism. We can account for the decrease in popularity for Truman as the rise in patriotism; the people wanted more resistance, not less. The enduring legacy of the Truman doctrine leaves behind a unity found in mutual fear.
Conclusion
Truman sent aid to unstable nations, rather than depriving enemy nations of aid as Roosevelt did in response to fascism in the 1930s.[23] The speech was a breaking point where individual freedom, so entrenched into American attitudes as “land of the free” finally superseded the need for peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.[24] The doctrine demonstrated the power of the idea of freedom and the fight against tyranny in establishing the scope of a president’s influence.
Truman sent aid to unstable nations, rather than depriving enemy nations of aid as Roosevelt did in response to fascism in the 1930s.[23] The speech was a breaking point where individual freedom, so entrenched into American attitudes as “land of the free” finally superseded the need for peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.[24] The doctrine demonstrated the power of the idea of freedom and the fight against tyranny in establishing the scope of a president’s influence.
Footnotes
[1] President Truman's Message to Congress; March 12, 1947; Document 171; 80th Congress, 1st Session; Records of the United States House of Representatives; Record Group 233; National Archives.
[2] President Truman's Message to Congress; March 12, 1947; Document 171; 80th Congress, 1st Session; Records of the United States House of Representatives; Record Group 233; National Archives.
[3] Robert Frazier, ‘Kennan, “Universalism,” and the Truman Doctrine.’ Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 11, no. 2, 2009, p. 3-34.
[4] President Truman's Message to Congress; March 12, 1947; Document 171; 80th Congress, 1st Session; Records of the United States House of Representatives; Record Group 233; National Archives.
[5] The British Embassy to the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, the Near East and Africa, Volume VII, 1946.
[6] Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, ‘The Enduring Significance of the Truman Doctrine,’ Orbis, vol. 61, iss. 4,
2017, Pages 561-574.
[7] Lawrence S. Wittner, “The Truman Doctirne and the Defense of Freedom,’ Diplomatic History, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 162
[8] Wittner, p. 163.
[9] Harry S. Truman 1965. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Vol. 1, Vol. 1. New York: New American library.
[10] Hugh Alexander Ambrose, ‘Truman, McCarthy and McCarthyism| The battle for the Cold War consensus,’ (1997). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers, 1997.
[11] George Kennan's 'Long Telegram'," February 22, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, 861.00/2-2246; reprinted in US Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 696-709.
[12] Executive Order 9835, issued March 21, 1947. (General Records of the US Government, RG 11.
[13] Speech of Joseph McCarthy, Wheeling, West Virginia, February 9 1950.
[14] Walter Lippman. The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1947).
[15] Lippman.
[16] Frazier, p. 6.
[17] Thomas G. Paterson. “Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman Years.” Diplomatic History, vol. 3, no. 1, (Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 8.
[18] Paterson p. 9.
[19] Presidential Approval Ratings -- Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends.’
[20] Wallace, Henry A. “Radio Address concerning President Truman’s Proposed Loan of $400 million to Greece and Turkey.” March 13, 1947, Reprinted in the Congressional Record, 80th Congress, First Session, Appendix, Volume 93, Part 10 (January 3, 1947-April 1-1947).
[21] Emory S. Bogardus ‘Public Opinion and the Presidential Election of 1948’. Social Forces 28, no. 1 (1949): 79–83.
[22] President Truman’s statement on the situation in Korea, 27 Jun 1950.
[23] Merrill, Dennis. “The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity.” Presidential Studies Quarterly vol. 36, no. 1 (2006), p. 28.
[24] Wittner, p. 161.
[1] President Truman's Message to Congress; March 12, 1947; Document 171; 80th Congress, 1st Session; Records of the United States House of Representatives; Record Group 233; National Archives.
[2] President Truman's Message to Congress; March 12, 1947; Document 171; 80th Congress, 1st Session; Records of the United States House of Representatives; Record Group 233; National Archives.
[3] Robert Frazier, ‘Kennan, “Universalism,” and the Truman Doctrine.’ Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 11, no. 2, 2009, p. 3-34.
[4] President Truman's Message to Congress; March 12, 1947; Document 171; 80th Congress, 1st Session; Records of the United States House of Representatives; Record Group 233; National Archives.
[5] The British Embassy to the Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, the Near East and Africa, Volume VII, 1946.
[6] Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, ‘The Enduring Significance of the Truman Doctrine,’ Orbis, vol. 61, iss. 4,
2017, Pages 561-574.
[7] Lawrence S. Wittner, “The Truman Doctirne and the Defense of Freedom,’ Diplomatic History, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 162
[8] Wittner, p. 163.
[9] Harry S. Truman 1965. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Vol. 1, Vol. 1. New York: New American library.
[10] Hugh Alexander Ambrose, ‘Truman, McCarthy and McCarthyism| The battle for the Cold War consensus,’ (1997). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers, 1997.
[11] George Kennan's 'Long Telegram'," February 22, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, 861.00/2-2246; reprinted in US Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 696-709.
[12] Executive Order 9835, issued March 21, 1947. (General Records of the US Government, RG 11.
[13] Speech of Joseph McCarthy, Wheeling, West Virginia, February 9 1950.
[14] Walter Lippman. The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1947).
[15] Lippman.
[16] Frazier, p. 6.
[17] Thomas G. Paterson. “Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman Years.” Diplomatic History, vol. 3, no. 1, (Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 8.
[18] Paterson p. 9.
[19] Presidential Approval Ratings -- Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends.’
[20] Wallace, Henry A. “Radio Address concerning President Truman’s Proposed Loan of $400 million to Greece and Turkey.” March 13, 1947, Reprinted in the Congressional Record, 80th Congress, First Session, Appendix, Volume 93, Part 10 (January 3, 1947-April 1-1947).
[21] Emory S. Bogardus ‘Public Opinion and the Presidential Election of 1948’. Social Forces 28, no. 1 (1949): 79–83.
[22] President Truman’s statement on the situation in Korea, 27 Jun 1950.
[23] Merrill, Dennis. “The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity.” Presidential Studies Quarterly vol. 36, no. 1 (2006), p. 28.
[24] Wittner, p. 161.
Further Reading and References
Primary Sources
President Truman's Message to Congress; March 12, 1947; Document 171; 80th Congress, 1st Session; Records of the United States House of Representatives; Record Group 233; National Archives.
Executive Order 9835, issued March 21, 1947. (General Records of the US Government, RG 11.
Speech of Joseph McCarthy, Wheeling, West Virginia, February 9 1950.
Harry S. Truman 1965. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Vol. 1, Vol. 1. New York: New American library.
George Kennan's 'Long Telegram'," February 22, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, 861.00/2-2246; reprinted in US Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 696-709.
Wallace, Henry A. “Radio Address concerning President Truman’s Proposed Loan of $400 million to Greece and Turkey.” March 13, 1947, Reprinted in the Congressional Record, 80th Congress, First Session, Appendix, Volume 93, Part 10 (January 3, 1947-April 1-1947).
President Truman’s statement on the situation in Korea, 27 Jun 1950.
American Presidency Project – Approval Ratings for POTUS
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1iEl565M1mICTubTtoxXMdxzaHzAcPTnb3kpRndsrfyY/edit?ts=5bd7f609&usp=embed_facebook
Secondary Sources
Ambrose, Hugh Alexander. ‘Truman, McCarthy and McCarthyism| The Battle for the Cold War Consensus.’ Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers, 1977, p. 179.
Bogardus, Emory S. ‘Public Opinion and the Presidential Election of 1948’. Social Forces 28, no. 1 (1949), pp. 79–83.
Frazier, Robert. ‘Kennan, “Universalism,” and the Truman Doctrine.’’. Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 2 (2009), pp. 3–34.
Mueller, John E. ‘Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson’. The American Political Science Review 64, no. 1 (1970), pp. 18–34.
Paterson, Thomas G. ‘Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman Years’. Diplomatic History 3, no. 1 (1979), pp. 1–18.
Rottinghaus, Brandon. ‘Reassessing Public Opinion Polling in the Truman Administration’. Presidential Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2003), pp. 325–32.
Smith, Kathy B. ‘Harry Truman: Man of His Times?’ Presidential Studies Quarterly 13, no. 1 (1983), pp. 70–80.
Smith, Tom W. ‘The Polls: American Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union and Communism’, n.d., 9.
Spalding, Elizabeth Edwards. ‘The Enduring Significance of the Truman Doctrine’. Orbis 61, no. 4 (1 January 2017): 561–74.
Lippman, Walter. The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 1947.
Wittner, Lawrence S. ‘The Truman Doctrine and the Defense of Freedom’. Diplomatic History 4, no. 2 (1980): 161–87.
Primary Sources
President Truman's Message to Congress; March 12, 1947; Document 171; 80th Congress, 1st Session; Records of the United States House of Representatives; Record Group 233; National Archives.
Executive Order 9835, issued March 21, 1947. (General Records of the US Government, RG 11.
Speech of Joseph McCarthy, Wheeling, West Virginia, February 9 1950.
Harry S. Truman 1965. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Vol. 1, Vol. 1. New York: New American library.
George Kennan's 'Long Telegram'," February 22, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, 861.00/2-2246; reprinted in US Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 696-709.
Wallace, Henry A. “Radio Address concerning President Truman’s Proposed Loan of $400 million to Greece and Turkey.” March 13, 1947, Reprinted in the Congressional Record, 80th Congress, First Session, Appendix, Volume 93, Part 10 (January 3, 1947-April 1-1947).
President Truman’s statement on the situation in Korea, 27 Jun 1950.
American Presidency Project – Approval Ratings for POTUS
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1iEl565M1mICTubTtoxXMdxzaHzAcPTnb3kpRndsrfyY/edit?ts=5bd7f609&usp=embed_facebook
Secondary Sources
Ambrose, Hugh Alexander. ‘Truman, McCarthy and McCarthyism| The Battle for the Cold War Consensus.’ Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers, 1977, p. 179.
Bogardus, Emory S. ‘Public Opinion and the Presidential Election of 1948’. Social Forces 28, no. 1 (1949), pp. 79–83.
Frazier, Robert. ‘Kennan, “Universalism,” and the Truman Doctrine.’’. Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 2 (2009), pp. 3–34.
Mueller, John E. ‘Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson’. The American Political Science Review 64, no. 1 (1970), pp. 18–34.
Paterson, Thomas G. ‘Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman Years’. Diplomatic History 3, no. 1 (1979), pp. 1–18.
Rottinghaus, Brandon. ‘Reassessing Public Opinion Polling in the Truman Administration’. Presidential Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2003), pp. 325–32.
Smith, Kathy B. ‘Harry Truman: Man of His Times?’ Presidential Studies Quarterly 13, no. 1 (1983), pp. 70–80.
Smith, Tom W. ‘The Polls: American Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union and Communism’, n.d., 9.
Spalding, Elizabeth Edwards. ‘The Enduring Significance of the Truman Doctrine’. Orbis 61, no. 4 (1 January 2017): 561–74.
Lippman, Walter. The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 1947.
Wittner, Lawrence S. ‘The Truman Doctrine and the Defense of Freedom’. Diplomatic History 4, no. 2 (1980): 161–87.